NextFin News - Andrew Bailey used June 14 to defend a Bank of England bond programme that once swelled to almost £900 billion and is now generating losses for the public finances. His target was Nigel Farage and Reform UK, but the real dispute is not about one line item on the Bank’s balance sheet — it is about who should carry the cost of Britain’s financial crisis, the eurozone debt crisis, Brexit and the pandemic.
Bailey’s case, set out in a letter published by the Times, is that quantitative easing should be judged by its total economic effect, not by the cash losses now visible as the Bank sells gilts and pays interest on reserves. He argued the purchases gave “very significant support” to the UK economy by protecting jobs and tax revenues. That is a broader claim than a technical defense of QE or quantitative tightening. It says the state should accept ugly fiscal arithmetic today if the intervention prevented deeper damage to output and employment when the shocks hit.
On the surface this looks like a fight over accounting losses; the real issue is how Britain prices emergency stabilization after the fact. Reform has spent months arguing that quantitative tightening forces the Treasury to absorb losses that run into billions and pushes up government borrowing costs, while also saying that ending interest payments on bank reserves could free up large sums for the public finances. That framing has obvious political force because it turns a central-bank operation into a taxpayer-versus-elite argument. It also blurs three different questions — whether QE worked, whether the unwind is being handled well, and whether reserve remuneration is the right design — into one attack on the Bank’s independence.
The sequence matters. The Bank began buying government bonds in 2009, expanded the programme after later shocks, and peaked at almost £900 billion in holdings in 2021. It is now selling much of that portfolio under quantitative tightening, and the losses being crystallized reflect not one bad decision but the interaction of emergency purchases, a sharp rise in interest rates and a delayed move from support to withdrawal. That logic is why Bailey can plausibly say the programme cannot be judged on today’s Treasury bill alone. It is also why critics have a live point: once rates rose, the same structure that cushioned earlier shocks became a visible transfer back onto the public balance sheet. The real trade-off is immediate stabilization versus later fiscal pain, not prudence versus recklessness.
Who benefits and who takes the pressure is clearer than either side admits. Bailey’s argument protects the Bank’s crisis toolkit and, by extension, the principle that central bankers should move fast in extreme conditions without being judged only on later mark-to-market losses. Reform’s critique benefits politically because visible losses are easier to sell than counterfactual claims about jobs preserved or tax revenues saved. Bailey also warned that ending interest payments on reserves would amount to a tax on banks and could force costs onto savers or borrowers. Whether that works depends on whether those costs can in fact be passed through, but the warning is serious: this is not about “free money” for the Exchequer, it is about changing bank incentives in a period when credit transmission still matters.
Bailey’s defense is credible on first principles, but it is not airtight. The strongest part is the claim that QE during the global financial crisis, Covid and other shocks supported output, employment and tax receipts when conventional policy was constrained. The weakest part is that the counterfactual can never be proved cleanly, which leaves him defending broad benefits against very concrete losses. The math doesn’t add up yet for anyone claiming certainty, either that QE was plainly worth every later cost or that the unwind proves the original policy was a mistake. The risk nobody is talking about is that the longer quantitative tightening continues, the more each gilt sale and each reserve payment turns a past crisis response into a fresh political grievance. Britain is no longer arguing only about monetary policy; it is arguing about whether emergency support should be judged by what it prevented or by the bill now arriving.
Explore more exclusive insights at nextfin.ai.
