NextFin News - Bank of England Governor Andrew Bailey said on Friday that there is still little evidence of second-round inflation taking hold in the UK, a stance that keeps the door open for policymakers to look through the energy-price shock rather than pre-emptively raise interest rates at their next meeting on 5 November.
The comments restate the view Bailey has held since the Middle East conflict sent Brent crude above $100 a barrel and pushed UK CPI inflation to 3.1% in August: the direct hit to the price level is real and unavoidable, but the wage-price spiral that turns a temporary shock into persistent inflation has not yet materialised. The distinction is the entire policy problem, and it is why the Governor's patience is drawing a more hawkish verdict from the bond market than from the MPC's own minutes.
The Evidence Bailey Is Leaning On
The Bank's September Monetary Policy Summary, published after the committee's 17 September meeting, put the position in plain terms: "There has been little evidence so far of material second-round effects in price and wage-setting." The MPC voted 6-3 to hold Bank Rate at 3.75%, with three members already pushing for a quarter-point rise to 4% - a split that has only grown more consequential as the November meeting approaches.
On the inflation side of the ledger, the arithmetic is unforgiving. Brent crude and UK wholesale gas rose 36% and 78% respectively between the July Monetary Policy Report and mid-September, with Brent at $106 a barrel and gas at 207 pence per therm at the close of business on 14 September. The Bank expects CPI inflation to reach around 3.75% in the fourth quarter of 2026, up from 3.2% at the time of the July report, and to tip slightly above 4% in the first quarter of 2027. That path would keep inflation above the 3% threshold at which the Governor must write to the Chancellor to explain the miss against the 2% target.
But the other side of the ledger - what has not happened - is where Bailey finds room to wait. The indirect pass-through of energy costs through firms' supply chains has been "small to date, and less than expected at the start of the conflict," according to the September minutes. Food-price inflation is the clearest example: the Bank's Agents now expect annual food inflation of around 4% at the end of 2026, down sharply from the 6-7% expected in April. That revision alone argues that the economy's second-round machinery is grinding more slowly than a supply shock of this size would normally imply.
"If households and businesses begin to incorporate higher inflation into wage demands and pricing decisions, a temporary shock can become persistent. These second-round effects are slower to emerge. Central banks must make forward-looking judgements and update them as the evidence changes," Bailey said in a speech at the Istanbul Economic Forum on 8 October.
The calendar is on his side, too. UK wage settlements are typically struck in the second quarter, so even if firms and workers begin to embed the energy shock into pay deals now, the effect on measured wage growth would not show up until well into 2027. At the July Monetary Policy Report press conference, Bailey framed his own position against that of some colleagues: "I don't think the evidence points to stronger second round effects but I think they think there will be you know stronger second round effects... my jury is out, as it were."
Why the First-Round Versus Second-Round Distinction Is the Whole Policy Problem
The distinction is not academic; it separates a price-level adjustment from persistent inflation, and it defines what monetary policy can and cannot do. A first-round energy shock raises the price level but does not, by itself, create ongoing inflation. As Bailey put it in March, after the conflict disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz: "Monetary policy cannot reverse this shock to supply. Its resolution depends on action taken at its source." What a central bank can do is prevent the shock from propagating into wages and core services inflation - that is where persistence is born, and that is the only channel interest rates can reach.
That is why the MPC's language pairs reassurance with a threat. The same September summary that reported "little evidence" of second-round effects also warned that "the risk of such effects, against which policy needs to lean, is greater the longer higher energy prices persist or are more volatile." The committee is trapped by lags. Monetary policy cannot wait for conclusive proof - by the time second-round effects are visible in the data, they are already underway. But acting too early risks pushing inflation below the 2% target if the shock proves smaller than feared, at the cost of unnecessary damage to output and employment.
Three transmission channels determine whether the shock sticks. First, the labour market: a loosening jobs market weakens workers' bargaining power and reduces the odds of catch-up pay deals. Second, firms' pricing power: in a soft economy, companies cannot simply pass every cost increase to customers without losing volume. Third, inflation expectations: if households and businesses stop believing the Bank will return inflation to target, the temporary becomes permanent.
On the first two channels, the data so far supports Bailey. The UK unemployment rate stood at 4.9% in the latest reading, and the Bank has noted that labour-market conditions have loosened. On the third channel, the signal is noisier. The Bank has acknowledged that repeated high-inflation episodes over the past five years may have raised people's attentiveness to price increases, and inflation expectations have risen in response to the current energy shock. This is the hinge on which the November decision turns: the Governor is betting that attentiveness has not yet hardened into behaviour.
History offers a precedent for exactly this kind of judgement. In 2011, the MPC faced an energy shock against the backdrop of a weak labour market and chose to look through it; inflation rose and then fell without a sustained wage-price spiral. The current episode is the milder-scenario analog, with the crucial difference that households today carry far more memory of high inflation than they did in 2011. That memory is what makes expectations the fragile variable.
The Bond Market Has Drawn a Hawkish Conclusion Bailey Has Not Endorsed
Financial markets have priced a more aggressive policy path than the Governor's words justify. The 10-year gilt yield climbed from around 4.2% in March to nearly 5.5% by mid-October, adding billions to the government's debt-interest bill and tightening financial conditions independently of Bank Rate. The 30-year yield touched 6% in early October, its highest level since January 1998. The UK 10-year yield stood at 5.32% on 15 October, according to interbank quotes.
That move reflects more than inflation fears, and Bailey made the point explicitly in Istanbul. He warned governments that fiscal policy must remain credible, arguing that "a continued commitment to the policy stance can then help to control the emergence of risk premia, something that is likely to happen otherwise when a major conflict in the Middle East breaks out." In effect, he flagged that the gilt market is pricing a fiscal risk premium as much as an inflation premium - and that central banks cannot stabilise expectations alone if fiscal policy is seen as drifting. The Institute for Fiscal Studies put a number on that gap: it expects Bank Rate to reach 4.25% by February, while markets imply a rise to around 4.75%.
The transmission from policy to the real economy is already biting hard, which is Bailey's second argument for patience. The quoted rate on two-year fixed-rate mortgages stood around 95 basis points higher than before the conflict began, the September minutes showed. Households with maturing mortgage deals are absorbing tightening that has already happened, even if Bank Rate itself stays at 3.75%. Raising Bank Rate on top of that would compound a tightening that has not yet fully worked through consumption and housing.
Sterling, by contrast, has been comparatively resilient. The pound traded around $1.326 on 15 October, down less than 1% over the past month despite the gilt selloff - a sign that foreign investors are not yet pricing a UK-specific credibility crisis in the currency. That stability gives the MPC additional room to wait, because a falling pound would itself import inflation and narrow the case for patience.
The Counter-Case: Why Waiting Could Be a Policy Error
The strongest argument against Bailey's patience is the simplest, and it is the one the three September dissenters made: central banks that wait for second-round effects to appear in the data have historically waited too long. Those members argued that a proactive increase in Bank Rate would reduce the probability of second-round effects setting in, and that setting policy as if stronger effects were coming - then course-correcting if needed - would prove less costly than the reverse. The Bank's own research, cited in the minutes, supported that asymmetry.
There is also the credibility question. With inflation at 3.1% in August and a trajectory pointing above 4%, a Governor who repeatedly emphasises "little evidence" of persistence risks appearing behind the curve if energy prices stay elevated through the winter heating season. The Ofgem price cap for October to December was set against higher wholesale costs, and any further rise in the cap in January would feed directly into the early-2027 inflation print - precisely when the spring wage round is being negotiated.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies, in its latest economic outlook, offered a more contained forecast: CPI inflation averaging 3.1% in 2026 and 3.0% in 2027 before returning to 2% in 2028, with the institute not expecting inflation to become entrenched in its baseline. But the IFS explicitly modelled an alternative scenario in which energy prices stay higher for longer: in that case, the Bank would face a more aggressive response, with Bank Rate peaking 0.5 percentage points higher at 4.75% before falling back. The gap between the IFS baseline and its shock scenario is a clean statement of the asymmetry Bailey is managing.
But the counter-thesis has its own weakness, and it is a serious one. Hiking into an energy-supply shock does not bring oil or gas supply back; it only destroys demand. If the futures curves for oil and gas - which the September minutes noted were still sloping downward - prove right, and the conflict resolves gradually, then a hike taken in late 2026 could be doing damage to output and employment long after the inflation impulse has faded. That is the trap: the policy that looks prudent in the inflation data can look excessive in the growth data a year later.
What to Watch: The Signals That Would Prove Bailey Wrong
Bailey's thesis rests on specific, observable conditions, which is what makes it falsifiable rather than merely hopeful. It would be undermined if core services inflation re-accelerates rather than continuing to moderate; if wage settlements in the spring of 2027 come in materially above the Bank's current projections; or if inflation expectations measured by surveys and market-implied breakevens de-anchor decisively above levels consistent with the 2% target. Any two of those signals appearing together would convert the "little evidence" assessment into a policy error.
The most important single data point is the spring 2027 wage round. Because settlements are struck in the second quarter, the pay deals agreed between April and June 2027 will reveal whether the energy shock has entered the wage-setting machinery. If average settlements run above 5% while productivity growth remains weak, the second-round channel is open and the case for holding at 3.75% collapses.
Conversely, the dovish case strengthens if energy prices continue to fall along the downward-sloping futures curve, if food-price inflation stays well below the 6-7% once feared, and if the labour market continues to loosen without a sharp rise in unemployment. Each of those outcomes would validate the look-through strategy.
Outlook: Three Scenarios for 2027
The base case, consistent with the Bank's own inflation forecast, is that CPI peaks slightly above 4% in early 2027 and then declines as the energy contribution fades, with second-round effects remaining contained. The policy path within that base case is where forecasts diverge: the Institute for Fiscal Studies expects Bank Rate to reach 4.25% by February before settling at 3.25% in the medium term, while the gilt market implies a peak near 4.75%. The MPC's actual route through that range will be decided by the wage data, not by the inflation peak itself. In this scenario, the October 2026 reassurance is vindicated: the shock was large but temporary, and second-round effects remained contained. Gilts would stabilise, the term premium would compress, and any discussion of cuts would wait for the wage evidence.
The upside case for inflation is a prolonged conflict that keeps Brent above $100 and pushes the Ofgem price cap higher into 2027, combined with wage settlements that embed 4% or higher pay growth. That would force the MPC's hand toward 4% or above, and the gilt market's hawkish pricing - the 10-year near 5.5%, the 30-year at 6% - would prove prescient. In that world, Bailey's patience would be read as a mistake made in real time.
The downside case is that the energy shock resolves faster than expected and the economy, already weakened by the 95-basis-point rise in mortgage rates, slows more sharply than the Bank anticipates. In that world, the debate shifts from "when to hike" to "when to cut," and today's hawkish gilt pricing looks like an overshoot. Fixed-income investors who locked in 5.5% on the 10-year would be the beneficiaries; banks and lenders exposed to mortgage repricing and weaker loan demand would carry the cost.
Across horizons, the read is not uniform. In the short term, volatility will stay elevated as long as Middle East headlines drive energy prices, and that favours staying data-dependent rather than committing to a direction. Over the medium term, the wage data between now and the spring 2027 round will decide the policy path. Over the long term, the stakes are larger than any single meeting: if the UK emerges from this episode with inflation expectations still anchored and a central bank that successfully looked through a supply shock, it would be a notable victory for the post-2021 inflation-fighting framework. If not, the cost will be measured in a lost decade of real wages.
Bailey's position, in the end, is a bet on lags: the lag between energy prices and wages, the lag between rates and the economy, and the lag between evidence and action. His jury remains out - but the verdict, one way or the other, will arrive with the spring pay packets.
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