NextFin News - Canadian businesses and households are both signaling that inflation is not done yet, and the two signals are starting to reinforce each other. In its third-quarter surveys released October 19, the Bank of Canada reported that firms facing larger-than-normal cost increases plan to keep passing them on to customers, while consumers' long-term inflation expectations rose to match already-elevated near-term expectations. The convergence matters: when long-term beliefs catch up to short-term pain, a temporary price shock starts to look like a persistent one. For a central bank that has been betting on a gradual return to its 2% target, the surveys add a fresh complication ahead of its October 28 interest-rate decision.
Layer 1 — The situation
The Bank of Canada's two flagship sentiment surveys — the Business Outlook Survey of roughly 100 firms and the quarterly Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations — delivered a consistent message in the third quarter of 2026: price pressures are traveling through the economy rather than fading.
On the business side, the Bank said firms facing larger-than-normal cost increases "plan to continue passing them on to customers," and for several firms the willingness to raise prices reflects both somewhat improved demand and efforts to recover margins compressed in earlier quarters. Firms' one-year-ahead inflation expectations, which had eased after an April spike driven by the war in the Middle East, rose again in September following the breakdown of Canada-U.S. trade talks and a renewed climb in oil prices. Expectations for inflation two years out remain elevated relative to the second quarter, while five-year expectations are roughly unchanged.
There is, however, a crack in business confidence about the disinflation timeline. When firms were asked when they think inflation will return to 2%, almost one-quarter — a larger share than in the previous quarter — said it was "too hard to say." That is not a forecast of higher inflation; it is a rise in uncertainty, and for a central bank that manages expectations, rising uncertainty is its own problem.
The survey's timing matters for interpretation. The Business Outlook Survey was conducted through in-person, video and phone interviews from August 6 to September 2, 2026, and about three-quarters of the interviews took place before trade talks between Canada and the United States broke down and new Canadian counter-tariffs were announced. Even so, the Bank said overall business sentiment improved in the third quarter after deteriorating in the previous quarter, and the share of firms planning or budgeting for a recession in Canada over the next 12 months declined from 17% to 6%, the lowest level since the question was introduced in 2023.
On the household side, the picture is more pointed. Consumers' perceptions of current inflation and their expectations for the next 12 and 24 months were little changed in the third quarter, the Bank said. But long-term expectations moved higher, "bringing them in line with already elevated short-term expectations." In other words, the anchor is not breaking — but it is drifting toward the short-term noise. Consumers continued to cite trade tensions and energy prices as the key sources of inflation, and expectations at every horizon moved higher after trade talks between Canada and the United States broke down.
The backdrop is a Canadian economy that is improving but still soft. The surveys' composite sentiment indicator edged higher, driven by better perceptions of financial health and a modestly improved view of the labour market, but it remains low — only slightly above the levels observed when trade tensions with the United States began. About half of consumers continue to expect the economy to fall into recession over the next 12 months, particularly those who responded after trade talks collapsed.
Layer 2 — The analysis
Why the convergence of long-term and short-term expectations matters
Central banks do not fear a one-off price jump. They fear the moment when households and firms stop treating a price shock as temporary and start building it into wages, contracts, and multi-year plans. That is the mechanism the third-quarter surveys expose.
The Bank of Canada's own framing is careful: near-term consumer expectations were "little changed," and firms' five-year expectations are "roughly unchanged." Read narrowly, nothing has de-anchored. But the direction of travel is what policymakers watch. Data compiled by Trading Economics from the Bank of Canada's survey series show one-year inflation expectations at 4.08% in the second quarter of 2026, up from 3.98% in the first quarter and well above the 2014-2026 average of 3.46%. The peak of 7.18% in the fourth quarter of 2022 — during the post-pandemic inflation surge — shows how far expectations can travel when households conclude that high inflation is the new normal.
The third quarter's movement is smaller than that episode, but the structure is similar: an energy shock plus a trade shock, both feeding the same belief that prices will keep rising. When long-term expectations rise to meet short-term ones, the central bank loses its most reliable ally. Expectations are supposed to do the tightening for it — households that believe inflation will fall spend less aggressively, firms that believe it will fall hesitate to raise prices. When expectations move the other way, they do the opposite: they add stimulus to an economy the Bank is trying to cool.
Passthrough is real, but it is selective — and demand is the gatekeeper
The second finding — that firms plan to pass costs through — sounds inflationary on its face. The detail matters more than the headline. The Bank's own survey work through 2026 has repeatedly shown that the ability to pass costs through varies sharply by sector and by demand conditions. Transportation firms, for example, typically have fuel-adjustment clauses in contracts that allow full or partial pass-through. Many other sectors list weak demand, constrained consumer budgets, elevated competition, and pre-existing contracts as reasons they cannot raise prices — and some are absorbing costs through margin compression instead.
Independent data support the selective picture. Statistics Canada's Canadian Survey on Business Conditions for the third quarter of 2026, released in August, found that 30.4% of businesses were very or somewhat likely to pass tariff-related cost increases on to customers over the following 12 months, while 36.3% did not expect to pass any such costs through and 34.9% had experienced no tariff cost increases at all. Only 20.6% of businesses anticipated raising their selling prices over the next three months.
That is not an economy in a wage-price spiral. It is an economy where firms with pricing power and contractual pass-through clauses raise prices, and firms facing weak demand eat the cost. The Bank of Canada survey's phrasing captures this exactly: it is firms "facing larger-than-normal cost increases" that plan to pass them on — not firms broadly.
The second-order implication is the one the market should focus on. Passthrough is not a binary switch; it is a function of demand. If demand strengthens — if the export recovery and commodity-driven activity spread — then today's selective passthrough becomes tomorrow's broad passthrough, because firms that currently cannot raise prices suddenly can. Conversely, if demand stays soft, the passthrough remains contained and inflation grinds down despite the energy and tariff shocks. The surveys therefore do not just measure inflation; they measure the condition under which inflation could re-accelerate.
The policy trade-off just got harder
This is where the surveys bite hardest. The Bank of Canada's policy rate stood at 2.25% as of September 2026, with the next decision scheduled for October 28. Inflation has been running above target — the annual rate was 3.0% in August, and RBC economists expect it to hold at 3% year-over-year in September, a third consecutive month. The Bank's preferred core measures have been better behaved, with trimmed-mean inflation at 1.9%, but the headline number is what households feel and what shows up in their survey responses.
RBC economists, assessing the data ahead of the October decision, framed the dilemma directly. Claire Fan and Abbey Xu wrote that
Canadian inflation data and the Bank of Canada's Q3 Business Outlook Survey on Monday will be watched closely for signs on whether inflation pressures from persistently elevated energy prices are broadening and permeating across the economy.
They expect
a somewhat contentious trade-off between inflation and growth risks to keep the BoC uncomfortably on hold through the rest of 2026.
The word "uncomfortably" does heavy lifting. A central bank on hold because both sides of its mandate are balanced is in the textbook case. A central bank that is uncomfortable on hold is one where the risks are moving against it.
The surveys push against a rate cut in two ways. First, higher inflation expectations and active cost passthrough argue that policy is not yet restrictive enough to guarantee a return to 2%. Second, and more subtly, the rise in firms saying it is "too hard to say" when inflation returns to target means the Bank cannot confidently promise disinflation either. Cutting rates into that uncertainty would risk validating the belief that the Bank is tolerating higher inflation.
But the other side of the trade-off has not gone away. About half of consumers expect a recession in the next 12 months. The sentiment indicators remain low. The Bank's July Monetary Policy Report projected that core inflation would ease gradually and that the path of CPI inflation would be "bumpy," with policymakers estimating the peak pass-through effect of higher oil prices at roughly 0.4 percentage points on CPI inflation. Holding too long into a weakening economy is its own mistake.
Cyclical or structural: a cyclical shock with a structural warning light
The right call on these surveys is that the shock itself is cyclical, but the expectations response contains a structural warning.
The cyclical case is strong. The drivers are identifiable and reversible: oil prices that spiked on Middle East tensions, and tariff costs that depend on the state of Canada-U.S. trade negotiations. TD Economics noted in July that both surveys were fielded before the de-escalation of U.S.-Iran tensions and the subsequent oil-price decline, which likely overstated the persistence of the energy shock. The Bank's own Q3 business survey confirms the pattern: one-year firm expectations fell after the April peak, rose again in September on renewed oil and trade pressures. That is mean-reverting behavior around a moving shock, not a permanent shift in the inflation regime.
The evidence that this is not yet structural is equally concrete. Firms' five-year expectations are roughly unchanged. The share of businesses expecting to raise selling prices — 20.6% — is a minority. Core inflation remains near target. Wage growth expectations are near the historical average, with cost-of-living adjustments as the main support and only one-tenth of firms citing recruitment pressure. A wage-price spiral requires wages and prices chasing each other; the surveys show neither accelerating.
But the warning light is the convergence of long-term and short-term consumer expectations. Structural inflation regimes begin exactly this way: not with a sudden break, but with long-term beliefs slowly drifting up to meet repeated short-term surprises until the drift becomes self-fulfilling. The 2021-2022 episode is the recent template — expectations started "transitory," ended at 7.18%. The difference today is that the Bank is watching the gauge in real time and has said explicitly that it is assessing whether higher oil prices spread beyond gasoline into other goods and services.
The judgment: this is a cyclical shock that has not yet become structural, but the margin for error is thinner than it was in the second quarter. The Bank can still treat the energy and tariff components as temporary — provided long-term expectations stop rising.
The counter-thesis: this is noise, not a regime shift
The strongest argument against reading too much into these surveys is the Bank's own: near-term consumer expectations were little changed, firms' five-year expectations are flat, and the surveys were largely collected before the late-August breakdown in trade talks. On that view, the third-quarter readings are a snapshot of temporary anger about gasoline and groceries, not a durable change in behavior. The trimmed-mean inflation rate of 1.9% supports it: strip out the volatile components, and underlying inflation is essentially at target.
There is force in this view. Survey expectations are notoriously noisy, and the gap between what consumers say in surveys and how they actually spend is wide — the same third-quarter survey showed consumers feeling better about their financial health, citing gains in financial asset values and greater confidence in the labour market. Households that feel wealthier do not behave like households bracing for permanent inflation.
But the counter-thesis has a blind spot. It treats the convergence of long-term and short-term expectations as noise when it is actually the specific variable the Bank has said it watches. And it leans on core inflation at a moment when the Bank itself has warned that the pass-through from energy to other prices is still working through the system. The counter-thesis is right that a regime shift is not underway today. It would be wrong to conclude that one cannot start.
The falsifying signal is specific: if the fourth-quarter consumer survey shows long-term expectations rising again — above the roughly 3% area where near-term expectations now sit — while near-term expectations remain elevated, the "transitory shock" interpretation fails and the de-anchoring risk becomes the base case. A second confirmation would be core inflation printing at 0.3% month-over-month or higher for two consecutive months, which would show the pass-through has moved beyond energy.
Layer 3 — Conclusion and outlook
The immediate beneficiaries and the exposed are clear. Canadian government bonds are the most direct transmission channel: the 10-year benchmark yield was around 3.83-3.85% in mid-October, and any evidence that expectations are drifting higher rather than stabilizing would push term premiums up and keep the long end of the curve elevated. The Canadian dollar is similarly exposed to the rate-path narrative — expectations that keep the Bank on hold, or tilt it toward tightening, support the currency; evidence that the passthrough is crushing demand does the opposite.
For households, the surveys confirm that the cost-of-living pressure is not a near-term phenomenon. Firms with pricing power — energy-linked sectors, transportation with fuel clauses, and consumer-facing businesses in tight local markets — can protect margins. Firms without pricing power, facing the 36.3% of businesses that do not expect to pass tariff costs through, will see margins compress instead.
The outlook splits cleanly by horizon:
- Short term (next 1-2 policy meetings): the Bank of Canada stays on hold on October 28. The surveys make a cut difficult to justify, and the growth data are not weak enough to force one. The bias is toward holding, with rhetoric that leans slightly more hawkish on the expectations side.
- Medium term (into 2027): the path depends on two variables — oil prices and the Canada-U.S. trade relationship. If both stabilize or improve, the April-September rise in expectations reverses and the disinflation narrative resumes. If trade tensions escalate and oil stays elevated, the Bank faces the uncomfortable scenario RBC described: holding into weakness while inflation stays above target.
- Long term: the structural question is whether the 2% target remains credible. Today the answer is yes — five-year expectations are flat, core inflation is near target, and wage growth is not accelerating. But credibility is maintained one survey at a time, and the next one is the fourth-quarter read.
What to watch, in order: the October 28 policy decision and statement wording on expectations; the fourth-quarter Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations in January, specifically whether long-term expectations rise again; and monthly core inflation prints, where two consecutive readings at or above 0.3% would confirm that pass-through has broadened beyond energy.
The Bank of Canada's bet has been that Canadians still believe inflation will fall back to 2%. The third-quarter surveys did not break that belief — but for the first time in this cycle, long-term expectations stopped waiting for it to happen and moved to where short-term pain already sits. Central banks can fight price shocks. What they cannot fight for long is their own public losing faith that the fight will end.
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