In a definitive statement on the future of European security, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has ruled out the development of an independent nuclear arsenal for Germany, instead proposing a framework to host French and British nuclear assets on German soil. Speaking during the 62nd Munich Security Conference (MSC) held from February 13–15, 2026, Merz addressed a global audience of over 1,000 participants, including approximately 60 heads of state. The Chancellor’s remarks come at a critical juncture as the transatlantic alliance faces unprecedented strain under the second administration of U.S. President Trump, whose "wrecking-ball politics" have forced European capitals to reconsider their reliance on the American security umbrella.
According to Tagesspiegel, Merz emphasized that Germany remains committed to its international legal obligations, specifically citing the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 1990 Two-Plus-Four Treaty, which facilitated German reunification. However, the Chancellor suggested that the current "nuclear sharing" model—which currently involves U.S. B61 gravity bombs stationed at the Büchel Air Base—could be expanded to include European allies. Merz noted that it is "theoretically possible" for German aircraft to be equipped to carry French or British nuclear warheads, thereby creating a more integrated European deterrent. This proposal follows confidential talks between Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron, who has long advocated for a strategic dialogue on the role of France’s nuclear forces in European security.
The shift in German policy is a direct response to the perceived erosion of the post-1945 rules-based order. The Munich Security Report 2026, titled "Under Destruction," highlights a growing sense of insecurity among G7 nations, with many citizens doubting their governments' ability to provide long-term stability. In this environment, Merz is attempting to navigate a narrow path between maintaining Germany’s pacifist identity and addressing the hard realities of 21st-century power politics. By rejecting a "German bomb" but welcoming "European arms," Merz seeks to strengthen the European pillar of NATO without triggering a regional arms race or violating constitutional norms.
From a strategic perspective, the Merz proposal addresses the "deterrence gap" created by the Trump administration’s transactional approach to NATO. While U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio struck a more conciliatory tone at the MSC than previous officials, European leaders remain wary of Washington’s long-term commitment to Article 5. France, currently the European Union’s only nuclear power with an estimated 290 warheads, offers a natural alternative. However, integrating French doctrine—which has historically prioritized national sovereignty—into a collective European framework remains a significant hurdle. Macron’s call for "audacity" in Munich suggests a willingness to move beyond the Cold War-era model, but the technical and political complexities of sharing command and control over nuclear assets are immense.
Data from the European Commission indicates that defense spending across the bloc has risen by nearly 80% since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, with NATO members recently agreeing to increase core defense spending targets to 3.5% of GDP. Germany’s willingness to host allied arms is part of a broader trend toward "strategic autonomy." This includes the development of the European Long-range Strike Approach (ELSA) and increased investment in ballistic missile defense. By offering to host French or British warheads, Germany provides the geographical depth and delivery platforms (such as the F-35 and Eurofighter fleets) necessary for a credible deterrent, even if it does not hold the "red button" itself.
Looking forward, the Merz doctrine is likely to face domestic political challenges. While the Chancellor’s CDU/CSU bloc supports a stronger defense posture, the proposal to host more nuclear weapons could revitalize Germany’s anti-nuclear movement. Furthermore, the reaction from Moscow will be a critical factor; any expansion of nuclear sharing is likely to be framed by the Kremlin as a provocation, potentially leading to further militarization of the Kaliningrad enclave. Nevertheless, the trend toward a more self-reliant European defense architecture appears irreversible. As Merz noted in Munich, the era of great-power politics has returned, and Europe must decide whether it will be a spectator or a participant in the new global order.
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