NextFin News - China's deputy central bank governor Xuan Changneng has called for an effective mechanism to bring private creditors into sovereign debt restructurings on comparable terms, as higher global borrowing costs pile pressure onto developing-country borrowers. In a statement released Sunday, the People's Bank of China said Xuan also pushed for improvements to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank debt-sustainability framework for low-income countries.
The remarks land four days after the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, co-chaired by the IMF, World Bank and the G20 presidency, issued its seventh progress report on the sidelines of the IMF-World Bank annual meetings in Bangkok. That report reviewed work to speed up restructuring processes and timelines - the same pain point Xuan's proposal targets. The timing is not incidental: China, now the world's largest bilateral lender to the developing world, is effectively arguing that the burden of fixing a stalled system should not fall on official creditors alone.
The Core Demand: Comparable Treatment With Teeth
Xuan's central ask is deceptively simple: create a mechanism that ensures private creditors participate in debt restructurings on terms comparable to those accepted by official bilateral creditors. This is the principle of "comparability of treatment," a cornerstone of the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments created in 2020.
Under the Common Framework, a debtor country that signs a memorandum of understanding with official creditors must then seek at least as favorable treatment from its other creditors - including private bondholders and commercial banks. In practice, that requirement has repeatedly failed to bind private creditors, who can hold out for full repayment, litigate, or use instruments such as total return swaps that obscure who actually owns the debt. The roundtable's October 14 report acknowledged the problem directly, stating that total return swaps "can significantly complicate a debt restructuring" by raising issues of intercreditor equity.
The mechanism Xuan proposes would close that gap. Rather than relying on voluntary coordination, it would institutionalize comparable treatment so that private-sector participation becomes enforceable rather than aspirational.
The Wave Of Distress Behind The Remarks
Xuan's intervention arrives in the middle of the largest cluster of sovereign restructurings in a generation. Since 2019, nine emerging markets have restructured government debt: Argentina, Chad, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Sri Lanka, Suriname and Zambia. Some, including Ghana and Sri Lanka, restructured both domestic and external debt, reflecting the scale of the stress.
The pressure comes from a simple arithmetic squeeze. During the pandemic, the G20 and Paris Club launched the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, which allowed 48 eligible countries to defer $12.9 billion of debt service. That bought time but did not reduce debt stocks. When global interest rates rose at the fastest pace in decades, refinancing that debt became dramatically more expensive. Countries that could roll over bonds at near-zero rates now face coupons that consume a far larger share of government revenue.
The Common Framework was supposed to be the answer. Only four countries have applied for treatment under its conditions - Chad, Zambia, Ethiopia and Ghana - and all four have now completed their processes with the Official Creditor Committee. That is a modest pipeline for a mechanism created to handle a systemic problem, and the slowness is the point. Zambia requested treatment in February 2021 but signed its memorandum of understanding with bilateral creditors only in April 2024, thirty-eight months later. A system that takes more than three years to produce an official-creditor agreement cannot keep pace with a distress cycle that moves in quarters.
Why Private Creditors Became The Bottleneck
The composition of low-income-country debt has changed fundamentally since the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the mid-1990s. At that time, private claims averaged about 5 percent of the public external debt eligible for relief. Today private creditors hold large shares of claims in many restructurings - meaning no deal can succeed without them. Yet the Common Framework's record shows how hard that participation is to secure.
Ghana and Zambia each restructured large sovereign bond portfolios: Zambia restructured $3 billion of Eurobonds, while Ghana's external bond exchange retired $13.1 billion of old bonds and issued five new restructured notes. These are real successes. But completion of the official-creditor stage is not the same as comparable treatment across all creditors.
In Zambia's case, the disparity was stark. Analysis of the 2023 bondholder deal found that under the enhanced payment terms, bondholders would be repaid 97 cents for every dollar lent in net present value terms, while official bilateral creditors including China and the UK would receive 79 cents - even though the bonds carried higher initial interest rates. That gap is exactly the inequity Xuan's proposal seeks to eliminate, and it is the kind of arithmetic that makes official creditors reluctant to move first. When official lenders know that private creditors will be made whole ahead of them, they have every incentive to delay, demand deeper cuts from the debtor, or walk away from the table.
Higher interest rates have made the problem worse. The IMF's threshold for countries with weak debt-carrying capacity sits at 18 percent of government revenue for external debt service. Zambia's restructuring was expected to bring external debt service down to about 14 percent of revenue from 2025 to 2033 - yet that threshold is still projected to be breached in 2026 and again between 2031 and 2034. Restructuring, in other words, has delivered relief that is already close to expiring. A borrower can be in compliance on the day a deal closes and back in distress within two years.
China's Position And Why It Matters
Xuan Changneng is a credible messenger on this file. He holds a PhD in finance from the University of Texas at Austin and a law degree from the University of Pennsylvania, and has served as PBOC Deputy Governor since October 2022 after leading the financial-stability bureau and serving as deputy administrator of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange. He has represented China at G20 finance and central bank deputies meetings and spoken at the Bank for International Settlements on international macroeconomic coordination.
China's advocacy for private-creditor participation is also self-interested - and that is precisely what makes it significant. As the largest bilateral lender to the developing world, Beijing has faced repeated criticism for moving slowly in Common Framework negotiations. In Zambia, China is estimated to hold about 30 percent of external debt, with figures ranging from $3.3 billion in official Zambian reports to $6.6 billion in independent research. By pushing for enforceable comparable treatment, China shifts part of the burden-sharing conversation onto Western private creditors - asset managers, bondholders and commercial banks headquartered in the same countries that have been quickest to criticize China's lending practices.
The argument is straightforward: official creditors - including Chinese policy banks - are being asked to write down taxpayer money, while private creditors can exploit those concessions by insisting on preferential recovery. World Bank analysis of the Common Framework makes the same point, arguing that private creditors "should not be allowed to, in effect, exploit those taxpayers' concessions by insisting on a preferential monetary recovery."
The Second-Order Effect: Repricing Sovereign Risk Before Distress
The first-order effect of Xuan's proposal is obvious: if private creditors can no longer hold out for better terms, restructurings should close faster and debtors should keep more resources. The second-order effect is subtler and cuts the other way.
The option to hold out is priced into sovereign bonds. Investors accept lower yields on distressed or near-distressed debt partly because they expect to recover more than the official-creditor haircut through litigation, negotiation leverage, or simply waiting. Remove that option, and the expected recovery rate falls. Rational investors will demand higher yields ex-ante to compensate. The result: countries with weak debt-carrying capacity could face higher borrowing costs before they ever reach a restructuring - the very outcome the framework is meant to prevent.
This is the central tension in any sovereign debt regime. Stronger burden-sharing rules reduce the cost of distress but raise the cost of borrowing; weaker rules do the opposite. The optimal design is not "maximum creditor participation" but the point where the marginal reduction in restructuring delay equals the marginal increase in ex-ante spreads. Xuan's proposal, as stated, does not address that trade-off. It assumes that faster restructurings are unambiguously good. They are for debtors and for official creditors who want to limit their losses. They are not necessarily good for the marginal borrower who now pays more to access capital markets.
There is also a moral-hazard channel. If private creditors know that official creditors will always move first and absorb the deepest losses, they have less incentive to monitor borrowers during the lending cycle. The discipline that comes from the threat of a disorderly default weakens. That discipline is imperfect, but it is one of the few market mechanisms that constrains both borrowers and lenders before a crisis begins.
The Counter-Thesis: Why A Mechanism May Not Be Enough
The strongest argument against Xuan's proposal is that the Common Framework's problem is not the absence of a comparable-treatment rule - the rule already exists. The problem is enforcement, and enforcement runs into sovereign immunity, domestic legal constraints in creditor jurisdictions, and the sheer complexity of modern creditor structures.
Official pronouncements on comparability are "replete with broadly drawn carve-outs and deference to the creditors' domestic legal constraints," one academic assessment of the framework concluded. Total return swaps, holdout creditors and collateralized claims each create separate legal obstacles that a high-level mechanism would not automatically resolve. Ghana's and Zambia's deals required years of negotiation even with the current rules in place.
There is also a credibility question. China's own participation in Common Framework negotiations has at times been slow, and Beijing has resisted pressure to disclose full lending terms. A proposal that asks others to bind themselves while China's own contract terms remain opaque invites skepticism about whether the mechanism would be applied symmetrically.
The falsifying signal is concrete: if the GSDR's next progress report - due at the 2027 IMF-World Bank spring meetings - shows that the average time from Common Framework request to completion has not fallen materially, and that private creditors in at least one active case have still not participated on terms comparable to official creditors, then the mechanism proposal will have failed to change outcomes. Process statements are not outcomes; only shorter timelines and verified comparable recoveries count.
What Comes Next
Short term, Xuan's remarks set up the next round of G20 and GSDR negotiations. South Africa held the G20 presidency in 2025 and made sovereign debt a central priority, pushing for a review of the Common Framework five years after its creation; the review continues under the current presidency. China's intervention gives Beijing a seat at the center of that review rather than on the defensive.
Medium term, the test is whether the proposal moves from rhetoric to a concrete instrument. Legislation in major creditor jurisdictions is the most plausible path. New York lawmakers have repeatedly introduced bills - including Assembly Bill A5290 and Senate Bill S5623, and the more recent Sovereign Debt Stability Act - that would limit preferential recoveries by creditors who refuse to participate in an agreed restructuring and strengthen protections against holdout litigation. The New York City Bar Association has argued that such measures retroactively strip creditors of contractual enforcement rights, and creditor groups have lobbied hard against them. If similar measures nonetheless gain traction in New York and London, where most sovereign bonds are issued, the mechanism Xuan describes becomes real.
Long term, the structural question is whether the global debt architecture can adapt to a multipolar creditor world. The Paris Club once handled restructuring among a small group of official lenders. Today's system must coordinate official creditors, private bondholders, commercial banks, and new bilateral lenders - with China now central. A framework designed for the old order cannot simply be patched; it needs new enforcement tools.
Cyclical Or Structural: Both, And They Point In Different Directions
This is the judgment that determines whether Xuan's proposal is a timely fix or a permanent redesign. Two forces are at work, and they must be separated.
The cyclical force is the interest-rate shock. Debt service became unmanageable because global rates rose, not because the architecture itself changed. When rates fall, refinancing becomes easier, and some borrowers that look distressed today will grow out of their debt. History supports this: previous distress clusters in the 1980s and the late 1990s receded as the rate cycle turned. If the current cycle follows the same pattern, the pressure on the Common Framework is temporary, and incremental improvements - faster timelines, clearer playbooks, better data - are the right response. The roundtable's April 2026 restructuring playbook for country authorities is exactly that kind of incremental tool.
The structural force is the creditor base. The shift from a small group of Paris Club lenders to a fragmented mix of official bilateral creditors, private bondholders, commercial banks, total-return-swap counterparties and collateralized lenders is not reversing. China's share of developing-country debt did not appear by accident and will not disappear when rates fall. Neither will the legal complexity that total return swaps and holdout structures introduce. On this dimension, the system that existed before 2020 is gone for good, and patching it will not restore it.
The policy implication follows directly. Cyclical relief calls for faster processing and better liquidity support. Structural change calls for enforcement tools that bind private creditors across jurisdictions. Xuan's proposal targets the structural problem. That is the right diagnosis - but it also means the fix will be slow, contested, and incomplete within any single rate cycle. Expect the cyclical symptoms to ease before the structural cure arrives.
Conclusion
The immediate beneficiaries of enforceable comparable treatment would be debtor countries currently stuck in restructuring - they would gain faster relief and less leakage to holdouts. The exposed parties are private creditors who have profited from the gap between official write-downs and their own recoveries. For China, the move is both a genuine contribution to global financial architecture and a defensive repositioning: it reframes Beijing from the slow creditor into the creditor demanding fairness.
Base case: the proposal produces incremental GSDR language and modest procedural improvements, but no binding enforcement within the next year. Upside case: New York and London adopt anti-holdout legislation, giving comparable treatment legal teeth and cutting restructuring timelines substantially. Downside case: the proposal stalls in mutual recrimination, and the next wave of distressed borrowers faces the same multi-year delays that have defined the Common Framework's first five years.
The success of any debt framework now depends not on how much official creditors concede, but on whether private creditors can be made to concede on the same terms.
For investors, the takeaway is that sovereign credit risk in emerging markets is increasingly a legal-risk question, not just a solvency question. The jurisdiction where a bond is issued - and whether that jurisdiction will enforce burden-sharing - may matter more than the borrower's debt ratios. Xuan's intervention makes that shift explicit, and puts private creditors on notice that the era of voluntary coordination may be ending.
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