NextFin News - In a sharp escalation of diplomatic pressure on private tech entities, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski on Tuesday, January 27, 2026, issued a public demand to billionaire Elon Musk to terminate Russian military access to Starlink satellite services. The request follows intelligence reports indicating that Moscow has successfully integrated Starlink terminals into its long-range drone operations, significantly enhancing the precision and reach of its aerial campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure and civilian centers.
According to Arab News, Sikorski addressed Musk directly on the social media platform X, stating that "making money on war crimes may damage your brand" and questioning why the service remains active for Russian use. The Polish diplomat’s intervention was triggered by findings from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), which revealed that Russian forces are increasingly utilizing Starlink to extend the operational range of BM-35 strike drones to approximately 500 kilometers. This technological leap places not only the entirety of Ukraine but also parts of Poland, Moldova, Romania, and Lithuania within the strike radius of Russian-launched unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
The controversy centers on the dual-use nature of the Starlink network. While Musk has previously denied selling terminals directly to Russia, Ukrainian intelligence services have documented a robust black market where Russian entities acquire the hardware through third-party intermediaries in neighboring regions. The challenge for SpaceX, the parent company of Starlink, lies in the technical difficulty of geofencing the service. Because the front lines are fluid, disabling terminals in Russian-occupied territories risks cutting off Ukrainian defenders who rely on the same constellation for secure communication and battlefield coordination.
This friction underscores a deeper systemic risk in modern warfare: the privatization of critical strategic infrastructure. For the past four years, Starlink has functioned as the digital backbone of the Ukrainian resistance. However, the relationship between the service provider and the coalition supporting Ukraine has been fraught with volatility. According to The Kyiv Independent, Poland currently finances approximately 50% of the 42,000 Starlink terminals operating in Ukraine, at an annual cost of roughly $50 million. Despite this significant financial contribution, European governments remain vulnerable to the unilateral decisions of a single private individual, a reality that Sikorski has previously described as strategically untenable.
The impact of Russian Starlink usage is already visible on the battlefield. By leveraging satellite connectivity, Russian drones can bypass traditional electronic warfare (EW) measures that typically disrupt radio-controlled links. This has led to a surge in successful strikes; overnight between Sunday and Monday alone, Ukraine reported facing 165 drone attacks. The integration of Starlink allows these drones to maintain high-bandwidth data links for real-time terminal guidance, even when flying deep into the Ukrainian rear where ground-based control signals would fail.
In response to this perceived unreliability and the security breach of Russian usage, a shift toward European technological sovereignty is accelerating. Denmark recently became the first ally to finance satellite communication services for Ukraine through the European Defense Agency, opting for European-produced alternatives. According to Militarnyi, the European Union is currently in advanced negotiations with four satellite operators—Luxembourg’s SES, Spain’s Hisdesat, Britain’s Viasat, and the French-British Eutelsat/OneWeb—to provide a redundant and politically accountable communication layer for the Ukrainian Defense Forces.
Looking forward, the confrontation between Sikorski and Musk signals the end of the "honeymoon phase" between Silicon Valley and global defense establishments. As U.S. President Trump continues to emphasize an "America First" approach to foreign policy, European nations are realizing that they cannot rely on the goodwill of U.S.-based private corporations for their core security needs. The development of the IRIS² satellite constellation, though not expected to be fully operational until the 2030s, has taken on new urgency as a long-term solution to this dependency.
In the immediate term, the pressure on Musk is likely to result in more rigorous end-user verification and enhanced geofencing capabilities. However, as long as Russia can exploit global supply chains to procure hardware, the cat-and-mouse game between satellite providers and sanctioned militaries will persist. The Polish government's vocal stance serves as a warning to the tech industry: in the current geopolitical climate, neutrality is increasingly viewed by frontline states as a form of complicity, and the reputational risks of being a "dual-use" provider may soon outweigh the commercial benefits.
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