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Russia Moves to Build a BRICS Space Council as Sanctions Close Its Launch Market

Summarized by NextFin AI
  • Russia proposes a BRICS space council to coordinate satellite-data sharing, joint missions, and orbital-network use, aiming to formalize a non-Western space-cooperation track as sanctions have closed most of its launch export market.
  • Western sanctions since 2022 cost Roscosmos roughly 180 billion rubles ($2.1 billion) in cancelled contracts, about 80 percent of its launch export revenue, while Russia's share of global orbital launches fell to ~7 percent.
  • The global remote-sensing satellites market is estimated at $48.62 billion in 2025 and projected to reach $84.35 billion by 2030 (CAGR 11.65%), making data-sovereignty standards the real prize of the council.
  • The council's substance hinges on three tests: binding technical standards, a funded work plan with named missions, and member asset commitments; the base case is a declared council with voluntary national funding rather than a regime shift.

NextFin News - Russia is moving to create a BRICS space council that would coordinate satellite-data sharing, joint missions, and the use of member countries' orbital networks, Roscosmos chief Dmitry Bakanov said in an interview in New Delhi on the eve of the 18th BRICS Summit. The proposal would formalize a non-Western space-cooperation track at a moment when sanctions have closed off most of Russia's launch export market and when the global remote-sensing market is projected to nearly double over the next five years.

The announcement, made on the sidelines of the BRICS leaders' gathering ahead of the September 12–13 summit, raises a question the communiqué alone will not answer: is this a new institution, or a new name for cooperation that already exists on paper?

The Proposal and What It Would Actually Do

Bakanov said the council's work would include satellite-data sharing, joint missions, and use of the members' respective orbital networks. The scope matters because it spans the three layers of modern space power: the data that satellites collect, the missions that put them there, and the orbital infrastructure that keeps them operating. That is broader than a data-sharing pact; it is an attempt to knit together an alternative architecture.

The timing is deliberate. India assumed the BRICS chairmanship on January 1, 2026, succeeding Brazil, and is hosting the 18th summit in New Delhi under the theme "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability." Russia arrives as a member with a concrete institutional ask. President Vladimir Putin reached New Delhi on September 11, and the council proposal gives Moscow a deliverable to place in front of the expanded bloc, which now includes Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates alongside the five founding members. The summit venue, Bharat Mandapam, will host delegations from 11 countries — a far larger room than the one that signed the 2021 constellation agreement.

But the groundwork is not new. In August 2021, the five original BRICS space agencies signed an agreement to build a "virtual constellation of remote sensing satellites" — a data-sharing mechanism rather than a physical fleet. The constellation was made up of six existing satellites: China's Gaofen-6 and Ziyuan III 02, the jointly developed Brazil-China CBERS-4, Russia's Kanopus-V type, and India's Resourcesat-2 and 2A. In May 2022, the BRICS Joint Committee on Space Cooperation was launched, adopting terms of reference, technical specifications for data exchange, and implementation procedures for joint observation, according to the China National Space Administration. In 2023, Russia proposed that other BRICS members could build a joint research station on its space station.

So the council is the third institutional layer on top of a 2021 constellation agreement and a 2022 joint committee. The question is whether it adds budget authority and binding technical standards, or whether it adds a brand.

The council's work would include satellite-data sharing, joint missions and use of their respective orbital networks.

That is the line that will be tested. Data sharing already exists in principle. Joint missions are expensive. Use of "respective orbital networks" implies interoperability — and interoperability is where blocs are actually built.

Why Russia Wants This Now

The motive is structural, not ceremonial. Since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions have cut Russia off from most of its launch export business. Roscosmos officials put the cost at 180 billion rubles — about $2.1 billion — in cancelled contracts with what Moscow designates "unfriendly countries," a figure analysts said represented nearly 80 percent of the corporation's launch export revenue. OneWeb abandoned Soyuz launches and switched to SpaceX, leaving more than $200 million in grounded hardware and prepaid launch services behind. The European Space Agency froze the ExoMars mission and halted Soyuz operations from the Kourou spaceport in French Guiana.

Domestically, the program is still flying. In a meeting with President Vladimir Putin, Bakanov reported 17 launches in 2025 and five more in the first months of 2026, from the Plesetsk, Vostochny, and Baikonur cosmodromes, using the Angara and Proton heavy-lift vehicles, the Soyuz medium-lift vehicle, and the Angara 1.2 small-lift vehicle. Russia's orbital group reached 364 spacecraft, and a low-orbit broadband satellite group was set up to operate globally. The first launch of the New Start conversion rocket from Baikonur is expected in the first quarter of 2027, and consolidation of satellite-construction assets is expected by the end of 2026.

But the cadence has contracted, and the gap with the other launch powers has widened into a chasm. Russia conducted 17 orbital launches in 2024, flat with 2025 and well below the 24 recorded in 2021. In the same year, the United States conducted 154 orbital launches and China 66. Russia's share of global orbital launches fell to roughly 7 percent. Flying and selling are different things. Before 2022, about two-thirds of Soyuz launches were commercial or in support of the International Space Station. The commercial half has largely evaporated. A council that locks BRICS members into Russian launch services, Russian orbital slots, or Russian data standards would rebuild a captive market that sanctions destroyed — but only if the other members agree to be locked in.

China is the hinge. Of the six satellites in the 2021 virtual constellation, three were Chinese or jointly led by China. China is also the senior partner in the International Lunar Research Station, in which Russia remains a core participant. In a BRICS space council, Russia brings launch vehicles and station experience; China brings the satellites, the manufacturing scale, and the capital. India brings a large domestic market and a proven launch industry that increasingly competes with both. The council's balance of power will be decided by who writes the technical standards.

There is also a bridge back to the West that Russia is keeping open. On July 13, 2026, at Baikonur, Bakanov met NASA Administrator Jared Isaacman and agreed that Russia will support International Space Station operations through 2030, with continued seat swaps on a no-exchange-of-funds basis. Until that point, Russia had been committed only through 2028. That is not the posture of a country that has fully exited the Western space order. It is the posture of a country hedging: building a parallel BRICS track while keeping the ISS lane open through 2030.

The Market That Makes This Worth Fighting Over

Remote sensing is no longer a niche. The global remote-sensing satellites market is estimated at $48.62 billion in 2025 and is projected to reach $84.35 billion by 2030, a compound annual growth rate of 11.65 percent, according to one industry research firm. Other forecasts put the 2025 base lower and the long-run ceiling higher — one places the market at $47.78 billion in 2025 and $122.86 billion by 2033 — but the direction is unanimous. Earth observation data is becoming a utility, sold to governments, insurers, miners, farmers, and climate-risk managers.

Whoever controls the standards for that data controls a slice of the revenue stream. A BRICS council that sets common formats, common calibration, and common access rules for its members' satellites creates a preferential market inside the bloc. For Brazil's agribusiness, India's monsoon forecasting, China's Belt and Road infrastructure monitoring, and Russia's Arctic surveillance, shared data is useful. For Western earth-observation companies, a closed BRICS data pool is a competitor that does not play by the same rules.

That is the second-order effect most readers will miss. The council is not primarily about launching rockets together. It is about data sovereignty: creating a sanctioned-resilient pool of geospatial intelligence that its members can use without relying on U.S. or European providers. In a world where satellite imagery is both a commercial product and a national-security asset, that is the real prize. The mechanism is familiar from other sectors: once a bloc writes its own technical standards, its members' procurement follows those standards, and suppliers outside the bloc face a compliance wall. In space, the wall is higher because orbital coordination, collision avoidance, and data calibration require continuous technical dialogue. A council that institutionalizes that dialogue inside BRICS quietly raises the cost of crossing back to Western providers.

The Counter-Thesis: This Is Declaratory, Not Transformative

The strongest case against reading this as a regime shift is simple: the cooperation already exists. The 2021 constellation agreement, the 2022 joint committee, the 2023 station proposal — the institutional skeleton is already built. A council announced on the sidelines of a summit, with no disclosed budget, no binding work plan, and no enforcement mechanism, may be a communiqué line rather than a capability.

There is also a divergence problem. India, the host and chair, walks a tightrope between BRICS and its deep space and defense ties with the United States. New Delhi buys American jet engines for its fighters, flies U.S.-made maritime patrol aircraft, and participates in the Artemis Accords framework for lunar cooperation. Binding India into a Russia-led or China-anchored space bloc would run against New Delhi's strategic autonomy doctrine, and against its practical need to keep Western technology flowing. Brazil and South Africa have limited space budgets and little appetite for expensive joint missions. China and India remain border rivals with unresolved territorial disputes. Russia and China are partners of convenience, not allies with merged space doctrines. And the expanded membership cuts both ways: more countries inside BRICS means a larger market for shared data, but also more voices that can block binding commitments.

And Russia's leverage is shrinking, not growing. Its launch exports are down by roughly 80 percent. Its launch cadence has fallen from 24 missions in 2021 to 17 in 2024 and 2025, while the United States and China have scaled up. A council needs a leader with something to sell; Russia is selling access to a market that sanctions closed. China has the satellites but has shown little interest in subordinating its own space program to a BRICS body. Beijing's preferred model is bilateral: the China-Brazil CBERS program, the China-Pakistan satellites, the lunar station with Moscow. Multilateral BRICS structures dilute Chinese control.

Both readings can be true at once: the political declaration is real, and the operational substance is unproven. That is why the falsifying signal matters more than the headline.

What to Watch: The Binding Test

The council will prove itself — or expose itself — on three observable tests.

  • Standards: Does the council adopt binding technical specifications for data exchange and orbital coordination, or does it endorse the 2022 committee's voluntary specs? Binding standards mean a bloc. Voluntary specs mean a forum.
  • Budget: Is there a funded work plan with named missions and contribution shares, or is the council a coordination mechanism with no money behind it?
  • Membership behavior: Does India commit assets beyond its 2021 constellation contribution? Does China place its commercial earth-observation data inside the BRICS pool, or keep it under national control?

If the summit communiqué contains only general language about cooperation, the structural-shift thesis is wrong: this is a cyclical diplomatic gesture, a piece of summit choreography that will mean-revert into the existing joint committee. If the communiqué names a secretariat, a budget line, and binding standards with a compliance mechanism, the regime-shift thesis holds. The specific falsifying signal: a summit document that creates a standing secretariat with a named budget and adopts standards that members are obligated to implement. Without those three elements together, the council is a working group with a new letterhead.

Outlook: Three Horizons

Short term (the summit, September 2026): Expect a declaration. The most likely outcome is a political statement endorsing the council in principle, with working groups tasked to report back. Markets should not price this as a contract award. The immediate beneficiaries, if any, are Russian launch contractors and the BRICS remote-sensing data users who gain a political umbrella for existing sharing arrangements.

Medium term (2027–2028): The ISS lane closes as a variable. Russia's commitment runs through 2030, but the seat-swap arrangement and the station's own health will determine whether cooperation survives. If the BRICS council begins funding joint missions in this window, the parallel architecture becomes real. If it does not, the 2021–2022 framework remains the ceiling. This is also the window in which Russia's New Start conversion rocket must fly — a Q1 2027 first launch from Baikonur is the stated target — and in which the consolidation of satellite-construction assets must complete. Miss those, and Russia has less to bring to the council table.

Long term (2030 and beyond): This is where the structural call lives. If the council survives its first budget cycle with binding standards, it becomes one of two competing geospatial-data blocs — a durable fragmentation of the global space order. If it does not, it joins the long list of BRICS working groups that produced dialogue but no divergence.

Base case: a council is announced with a secretariat and working groups, but funding remains national and voluntary. Upside case for the thesis: binding data standards and a joint mission budget are adopted, with China committing commercial earth-observation assets. Downside case: the council is mentioned only in general terms and implementation reverts to the 2022 joint committee.

The verdict: this is a structural hedge with declaratory packaging. Russia is trying to convert its remaining space assets — launch vehicles, station experience, Arctic orbits — into institutional leverage inside a bloc that controls a fast-growing share of the world's earth-observation demand. The packaging is soft; the intent is not. The market to watch is not launch manifests. It is the standards documents. If BRICS writes its own rules for satellite data, the space order has split whether or not anyone calls it that.

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