NextFin News - The United States and Israel have entered high-level discussions regarding the deployment of special operations forces into Iranian territory to seize or neutralize the Islamic Republic’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium. According to four sources familiar with the matter cited by Axios, the proposed ground incursion represents a dramatic escalation in "Operation Roaring Lion," the joint military campaign launched on February 28, 2025, following the death of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. While U.S. President Trump has publicly expressed a desire to avoid a "forever war," the administration has privately identified the securing of Iran’s nuclear material as a non-negotiable war objective to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed "rump state" under a successor regime.
The strategic pivot toward a ground-based "seize and secure" mission follows a week of intensive aerial bombardment that has degraded much of Iran’s conventional military infrastructure but left its most sensitive nuclear assets largely intact. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports from early March indicate that while above-ground facilities at Natanz have sustained significant damage, the core stockpiles of uranium enriched to 60% purity—estimated to be sufficient for up to 11 nuclear devices—remain shielded in fortified underground bunkers. Military planners in Washington and Tel Aviv now argue that air strikes alone cannot guarantee the elimination of these materials, which could be moved or hidden as the central government’s grip on power weakens.
U.S. President Trump’s involvement in these deliberations marks a departure from his initial "maximum pressure" rhetoric toward direct kinetic intervention. Aboard Air Force One on Saturday, the U.S. President confirmed he had ruled out the use of Kurdish proxy forces for this specific task, insisting that the operation must remain a tightly controlled Western-led effort to avoid regional fragmentation. "The war is complicated enough as it is without the Kurds getting involved," Trump told reporters, signaling a preference for elite U.S. and Israeli units over local militias. This cautious approach to proxies contrasts with the aggressive posture of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who declared on Saturday that a "systematic plan to eradicate the Iranian regime" is already in its second phase.
The risks of such a mission are staggering. Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) spokesperson Ali Mohammad Naini countered the reports by claiming Tehran is prepared for at least six more months of high-intensity conflict, threatening the deployment of "advanced and unusual long-distance missiles" in the coming days. The IRGC’s ability to maintain a command-and-control structure despite the loss of Khamenei remains the primary variable. If special forces are inserted into a chaotic environment where the chain of command has broken down, they face the prospect of urban warfare against "dead hand" units tasked with defending the nuclear sites at any cost.
Economically, the prospect of a ground incursion has already sent tremors through global energy markets, though the impact has been partially mitigated by the U.S. President’s insistence on a "quick and decisive" conclusion. However, the humanitarian toll is mounting; Lebanese authorities report that over 450,000 people have been displaced in the last week alone as Israel expands its strikes against Iranian-linked targets in Beirut. The diplomatic fallout is equally severe, with Trump openly criticizing British Prime Minister Keir Starmer for refusing to allow the use of the Diego Garcia base for offensive operations, a rift that threatens the traditional "special relationship" at a moment of peak geopolitical volatility.
As the Iranian Assembly of Experts prepares to meet—potentially virtually due to the destruction of their physical headquarters—to name a successor to Khamenei, the window for a negotiated settlement is closing. The U.S. and Israel are betting that by physically removing the nuclear "trump card" from the board, they can force a total capitulation of the IRGC. Yet, the history of special operations in hostile territory suggests that "securing" a nuclear stockpile is rarely as surgical as the briefing slides suggest. The coming days will determine whether this plan remains a contingency or becomes the opening salvo of the most dangerous phase of the war.
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